We show that ef cient bargaining is impossible for a wide class of economic settings and property rights. These settings are characterized by (i) the existence of "opt-out types," whose participation does not change the ef cient allocation, and (ii) non-existence of the "marginal core," and its multivaluedness with a positive probability. We also examine the optimal allocation of property rights within a given class that satis es (i), such as simple property rights, liability rules, and dual-chooser rules. We characterize property rights that minimize the expected subsidy required to implement ef ciency. With two agents, simple property rights that are optimal in this way maximize the expected surplus at the status quo allocation, but this no longer holds with more agents. We also study "secondbest" budget-balanced bargaining under a liability rule. The optimal "second-best" liability may differ from, but is close to, the "expectation of the victim's harm," which would be optimal if there were no bargaining. Changes in property rights that raise expected surplus at the status quo and reduce the probability of renegotiation may sometimes reduce the ef ciency of second-best bargaining allocation. "When ef cient bargaining is impossible due to asymmetric information, property rights can (JEL: D23, D47, C78, K11)
Introduction
Property rights specify an initial default position from which agents may subsequently bargain to determine their ultimate allocation. Following the seminal article of Grossman and Hart (1986), the economics literature discussing the optimal allocation of property rights has largely focused on how they affect ex ante investments, under the assumption that bargaining always results in ex post ef cient outcomes. In this paper, it requires only the veri cation of two simple conditions: (i) existence of "adverse ef cient-opt-out types" and (ii) non-emptiness of the core (actually, non-emptiness of a larger set that we call the "marginal core") and its multi-valuedness with a positive probability. 4 We de ne an "ef cient-opt-out type" as a type whose non-participation is consistent with ef ciency (for any types of the other agents). In addition, for settings that involve externalities, such as liability rules, we de ne an "adverse type" as a type who, when he does not participate and behaves noncooperatively (e.g., chooses optimally whether to damage others under a liability rule), minimizes the total expected surplus available to the other agents. (In settings with simple property rights, in which externalities are absent, any type is trivially an adverse type.) Our inef ciency result applies when each agent has a type that is simultaneously an ef cient-opt-out type and an adverse type. This assumption is clearly restrictive -for example, it is not satis ed in the presence of intermediate (or randomized) property rights of the kind considered by Cramton et al. (1987) and Segal and Whinston (2011) . Nevertheless, we show that this assumption is satis ed in a number of settings involving simple property rights, liability rules, and dual-chooser rules. (We also allow this assumption to hold in an asymptotic form: e.g., a type may become an "almost" adverse ef cient-opt-out type as the type goes to C1.)
In contrast, the non-emptiness and multi-valuedness of the core is a typical feature of economic settings. For example, if, under an appropriate de nition of "goods," a price equilibrium exists (e.g., a Walrasian equilibrium, or a Lindahl equilibrium), then it will be in the core, and "generically" the core will be multi-valued (except for some limiting "competitive" cases with a large number of agents, where the core may converge to a unique Walrasian equilibrium).
Having identi ed a class of settings in which achieving ef ciency is impossible, we then turn to an analysis of the optimal allocation of property rights in those cases. In doing so, we take a mechanism design approach to bargaining, asking what property rights would be optimal if bargaining takes as ef cient a form as possible given the allocation of property rights.
We use two different measures of ef ciency to identify optimal property rights. In the rst, we assume that there is an outside agency who will subsidize the bargaining process in order to achieve ef ciency and we examine the effect of property rights on the expected subsidy that is required. One corollary of our impossibility analysis is a simple formula for this expected subsidy. The formula allows us to compare the subsidies required by the various property rights that satisfy (i) and (ii). Among such property rights, we can identify those that minimize the intermediary's expected subsidy.
One interesting benchmark for comparison is the property rights that would maximize the expected surplus were bargaining impossible. With two agents and simple property rights that induce ef cient-opt-out types, we show that the intermediary's expected rst-best subsidy equals the expected bargaining surplus, and therefore minimizing this expected subsidy is equivalent to maximizing the expected status quo surplus. For example, in the buyer-seller model of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) , if we can choose who should initially own the object, it is optimal to give it to the agent with the higher expected value for it. We also identify the optimal option-to-own (liability rule) in this same setting, and show that it is exactly the same as the optimal option-to-own when bargaining is impossible, involving an option price (damage payment) that equals the expected value (harm) of the non-choosing agent (victim) . As in the case without bargaining, the optimal option-to-own is strictly better than the best simple property right, but fails to achieve the rst best when there is uncertainty about the value of the non-choosing agent.
However, the equivalence between what is best for minimizing the expected rstbest bargaining subsidy and what is best absent bargaining generally breaks down when there are more than two agents: in such cases, we instead want to raise the values of coalitions including all but one agent (reducing the "hold-out power" of individual agents). We illustrate the difference in two examples, one concerning the optimal ownership of spectrum, and the other examining the optimal liability rule for pollution when there are many victims.
Evaluating property rights by their effects on the expected subsidy required for rst-best bargaining may not be the right thing to do, since in most cases a benevolent intermediary willing to subsidize bargaining is not available. Our second ef ciency measure is instead the maximal ("second-best") expected surplus that can be achieved in budget-balanced bargaining. Analysis of the second-best problem is complicated by the fact that the optimal allocation rule depends on the identity of the agents least willing to participate (the "critical types"), which in turn depends on the allocation rule. Unfortunately, we are unable to solve for the second-best bargaining procedure at a comparable level of generality to our rst-best subsidy calculation. For this reason, we focus on the case of just two agents.
When divided property rights are not possible, we know from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) that ef ciency is impossible when the budget must be balanced. In such cases, however, use of a liability rule (option-to-own) may offer an improvement over (and can be no worse than) what can be achieved with the best undivided property right.
To identify the optimal liability rule, we begin by characterizing the second-best bargaining mechanism for a given liability rule. Doing so we identify the critical types for each agent, and the optimal allocation rule. 5 We then use this characterization to study the dependence of the maximal expected surplus on the option price.
We rst consider the case in which both agents' values are distributed uniformly. We nd that the second-best expected surplus is maximized by setting the option price equal to the expected value of the non-choosing agent (the "victim"), which is 1/2 under our normalization. Thus, in the uniform case the optimal option price under secondbest bargaining proves to be the same as the price that minimizes the expected rst-best subsidy, which is in turn the same as the optimal price in the absence of bargaining.
At the same time, we nd a signi cant difference in how the second-best expected surplus and the expected rst-best subsidy vary with the option price. Namely, while in the uniform example the expected rst-best subsidy is always lower the closer the price is to 1/2, the second-best expected surplus does not increase monotonically with such changes. Instead, we nd that setting the price close to 0 or to 1 yields a lower expected second-best surplus than setting it at exactly 0 or 1 (which corresponds to giving one of the agents a simple property right to the object). In fact, we show that the same conclusion extends to all distributions of the two agents' valuations (not just uniform). Thus, contrary to the intuition one might take from the results of Cramton et. al (1987) , less extreme property rights (in the form of a option price that sometimes leads to exercise of the option) may be worse than extreme ones.
Finally, we explore cases in which the two agents' valuations are drawn from different distributions and show that the optimal option price is not generally equal to the victim's expected harm. Nonetheless, an intriguing fact is that in all of the cases we study the optimal option price is very close to the victim's expected harm, and the loss from instead setting the option price equal to that expected harm is small.
In addition to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) , a number of other papers examine the effect of property rights on bargaining ef ciency. Most, like our previous paper [Segal and Whinston (2011)] establish conditions under which the rst best is achievable [for additional references, see our (2011) working paper and Segal and Whinston (2013)]. Others established impossibility of ef cient bargaining in some settings [see Segal and Whinston (2013) , Makowski and Ostroy (1989) , and Matsushima (2012) ]. Matouschek (2004) was the rst paper to consider second-best optimal property rights under asymmetric information bargaining. He studied a model in which asset ownership x is set irrevocably ex ante, and bargaining over other decisions q occurs ex post after agents' types are determined. In contrast to much of our analysis, bargaining is not allowed to redistribute the initial property rights. He nds that, depending on the parameters, the optimal property rights x will either maximize the total surplus at the disagreement point (as if no renegotiation were possible) or minimize it. Mylovanov and Troger (forth.) analyzes a two-agent setting like ours, but instead uses a speci c bargaining protocol in which one agent has the power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other agent. Finally, in unpublished notes, Che (2006) examines the optimal option-to-own for minimizing the expected rst-best subsidy.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe our basic model. Section 3 derives our inef ciency result. In Section 4, we analyze the optimal property rights for minimizing the rst-best subsidy. Section 5 analyzes optimal second-best property rights. Section 6 extends our analysis to consider dual-chooser rules. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Set-Up
We consider a general model with N agents, indexed by i D 1; : : : ; N , who bargain over a nonmonetary decision x 2 X , as well as a vector t 2 R N of monetary transfers. Each agent i privately observes a type Â i 2 ‚ i , and his resulting payoff is v i .x; Â i / C t i . We assume that the types . Q Â 1 ; : : : ; Q Â N / 2 ‚ 1 : : : ‚ N are independent random variables.
We will be interested in examining what is achievable given some initial property rights when the agents engage in the best possible bargaining procedure after their types are realized. To this end, we take a mechanism design approach to bargaining. Appealing to the Revelation Principle, we focus on direct revelation mechanisms h ; i, where W ‚ ! X is the decision rule, and W ‚ ! R N is the transfer rule. In particular, we will be interested in implementing an efficient decision rule , which solves:
.Â/ 2 arg max
When considering direct revelation mechanisms that correspond to bargaining mechanisms, we restrict them to satisfy budget balance:
and (Bayesian) Incentive Compatibility:
Next we consider participation constraints. For this purpose, we need to describe what outcome each agent i expects when he refuses to participate in the bargaining mechanism. In general, this outcome will depend on the property rights mechanism in place and, in general, on the types of the other agents. For example, the other agents may make some noncooperative choices under a liability rule, and these choices may depend on their types. Alternatively, the other agents may be able to bargain with each other over some parts of the outcome without the participation of agent i, and this bargaining may have externalities on agent i. It is also possible that if agent i refuses to participate, the default will involve a noncooperative game among agents, and the outcome of this game will depend on all the agents' types.
To incorporate all these possibilities, we assume that if agent i refuses to participate and the state of the world is Â , the nonmonetary decision is O x i .Â/, and agent i receives a transfer O t i .Â /. The resulting reservation utility of agent i is therefore 
Furthermore, the same reservation utility applies when the status quo can be renegotiated by a subset of agents but such renegotiation does not affect the utility of the nonparticipating agent (e.g., because renegotiation can only involve exchange of private goods). In general, the functions O x i .Â/ and O t i .Â/ depend on both the property rights and assumptions about bargaining.
Given these functions and the resulting reservation utility, the (interim) individual rationality constraints of agent i can be written as
We will say that a property rights mechanism permits efficient bargaining if it induces functions
such that there exists a budget-balanced, incentivecompatible, and individually rational mechanism implementing an ef cient decision rule . /.
An Inefficiency Theorem
In this section, we provide a set of suf cient conditions ensuring that ef cient bargaining is impossible given a set of initial property rights. Our result will have Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) result, and several others, as special cases.
Characterization of Intermediary Profits
It will prove convenient to focus on mechanisms in which, for some vector of types . O Â 1 ; : : : ; O Â N /, payments take the following form:
Note that these payments describe a Vickey-Clarke-Groves ("VCG") mechanism [see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), Chapter 23] . The portion of the payment that depends on the agents' announcements, P j ¤i v j .Â/ ; Â j , causes each agent i to fully internalize his effect on aggregate surplus, thereby inducing him to announce his true type and implementing the ef cient allocation rule . /. The xed participation fee K i . O Â i /, on the other hand, equals type O Â i 's expected gain from participating in the mechanism absent the xed charge, so it causes that type's IR constraint to hold with equality. If we imagine that there is an intermediary in charge of this trading process, its expected pro t with this mechanism, assuming all agents participate, is given by
To ensure that all types participate, the participation fee for each agent i can be at
If there exists a type O Â i achieving the in mum, i.e.,
it will be called agent i's critical type. This is a type that has the lowest net expected participation surplus in the mechanism. The sign of the expected pro t (5) determines whether property rights permit ef cient bargaining: 6 L 1. (i) Any property rights mechanism at which 0 permits efficient bargaining. (ii) If, moreover, for each agent i, ‚ i is a smoothly connected subset of a Euclidean space, and v i .x; Â i / is differentiable in Â i with a bounded gradient on X ‚, then a property rights mechanism permits efficient bargaining only if 0:
3.1.1. Adverse Efficient-opt-out Types. For each agent i, let
denote the joint payoff of agents other than i when agent i chooses not to participate in the bargaining mechanism. (Observe that we assume there is budget balance in the event of nonparticipation, so that the collective transfer to agents other than i when agent i opts out is O t i .Â/.) Since V .Â/ is the maximal achievable surplus in state Â, we have:
We now introduce two notions that are central to our analysis: ef cient opt-out types and adverse types. D 1. Given a property rights mechanism, type Â i of agent i is an efficient-
Note that if Â i is an ef cient-opt-out type, then V .
That is, there are never any gains from trade between type Â i and the other agents, regardless of their types. D 2. Given a property rights mechanism, type Â i of agent i is an adverse
Type Â i is an adverse type if, conditional on agent i opting out, agents other than i are worst off collectively (in expectation) when agent i's type is Â i . Note in particular that any type Â i is trivially an adverse type when agent i imposes no externalities on the other agents, so O V i .Â / does not depend on Â i . This is the case, for example, with simple property rights. E 1. Suppose that each of two agents i D 1; 2 has a value Â i for an object, where Â i is drawn from distribution F i on OE0; 1. Agent 1 faces a liability rule and pays agent 2 price p 2 OE0; 1 if he chooses to take the object: In this case, O V 1 .Â 1 ; Â 2 / D max¹Â 1 p; 0º and O V 2 .Â 1 ; Â 2 / D Â 2 1 ¹Â 1 <pº C p 1 ¹Â 1 pº . Then agent 2's type Â 2 D p is an ef cient-opt-out type, since when he has this value the outcome of agent 1's exercise decision is ef cient regardless of agent 1's type. That type of agent 2 is trivially an adverse type because agent 1's payoff when exercising the option does not depend on agent 2's type.
On the other hand, both Â 1 D 1 and Â 1 D 0 are ef cient-opt-out types for agent 1: when Â 1 D 1, agent 1 will always exercise under the liability rule, and it is always ef cient for him to do so regardless of agent 2's type; when instead, Â 1 D 0, agent 1 will never exercise under the liability rule, which is also always ef cient. Of these two types, Â 1 D 0 is an adverse type for agent 1 when EOEÂ 2 < p, since then agent 2 prefers for agent 1 to exercise the option and agent 1 never does, while Â 1 D 1 is an adverse type for agent 1 when EOEÂ 2 > p:
The signi cance of these de nitions for our results stems from the following observation:
When agent i has a type Â ı i that is both an adverse type and an efficientopt-out type, it is a critical type.
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Proof. We can then write for all
where the equality is because Â ı i is an ef cient-opt-out type, the rst inequality is because Â ı i is an adverse type, and the second inequality is by (6) .
Our results will apply not only to settings in which adverse ef cient-opt-out types exist, but also to settings in which their existence is only of the following asymptotic form:
The adverse efficient-opt-out property holds for agent i if there exists a sequence ¹Â k i º 1 kD1 in ‚ i such that as k ! 1,
Note that this property holds whenever agent i has an adverse ef cient-opt-out type Â ı i (in which case we can let Â k i D Â ı i for all k), but it may also hold in other casese.g., sometimes we may need to take a sequence with Â k i ! C1 (in which case we may say informally that Â i D C1 is an adverse ef cient-opt-out type). This property allows us to express the intermediary's expected pro ts as follows:
If the adverse efficient-opt-out property holds for each agent, the intermediary's expected profit (5) can be written as follows:
Proof.
Hence, if this holds for all agents, we obtain (7) .
Inefficiency Result
The adverse ef cient-opt-out property is a restrictive property, but it will hold in a number of settings of interest. On the other hand, the second property we require in Proposition 1 below is usually satis ed. It makes use of the following notion:
Compared to the usual notion of the core, the marginal core considers only coalitions that include N-1 agents. Condition (i) simply says that the coalition consisting of all agents except agent i does not block (assuming "blocking" yields the coalition the same collective payoff it receives when agent i opts out), while condition (ii) says that the maximal total surplus is achieved. Using (ii), condition (i) can be rewritten as w i Ä V .Â/ O V i .Â/, i.e., no agent i can receive more than his marginal contribution to the total surplus. P 1. Suppose that the assumptions of Lemma 1(ii) hold, the adverse efficient-opt-out property holds for each agent, and the set of marginal core payoff vectors is non-empty in all states and multi-valued with a positive probability. Then efficient bargaining is impossible.
Proof. (7) implies that
Now, for a marginal core payoff vector w, for each i we have
If the marginal core is multi-valued, then there exists such a w with the inequality holding strictly for at least one agent , and so summing up the inequalities overl all agents yields
If this inequality holds with positive probability, (8) implies that < 0, and so the impossibility of ef cient bargaining is implied by Lemma 1(ii).
Proposition 1 provides a suf cient condition that can be used to con rm that ef ciency is impossible, and that is much easier to check in some settings than is the expected pro t calculation required by Lemma 1. Indeed, in many cases the assumptions of the propositions can be checked without making any assumptions about distributions of types. 7 We provide some examples in the next subsection.
Some Applications
The assumptions of Proposition 1 cover many classical economic settings. We begin with the classical setting of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) , in which the set of agents is I D ¹s; bº (a seller and a buyer),
Since simple property rights involve no externalities, any type is trivially an adverse type. The core of this cooperative game is multi-valued whenever gains from trade are strictly positive (which happens with a positive probability) and single-valued otherwise. Hence, Proposition 1 applies. 8 Now we show how this approach extends to settings with more than two agents and property rights that generate no externalities, i.e., in which an agent who refuses to participate is guaranteed some consumption and does not care what the other agents do. In such settings, all types are trivially adverse types. Furthermore, the IR constraints (1) make clear that the possibility of ef cient bargaining is determined by the reservation utilities O V i . / of individual agents who refused to participate but not by the joint surplus O V i . / of the remaining agents. Thus, changes in property (5) and the possibility of ef cient bargaining. In the applications below, there is a natural way to specify O
The proposition does not even require type distributions have positive densities; it is formally correct even if types do not have full support. However, because our de nition of "ef cient bargaining" requires ef ciency even for types with zero density, in such cases the proposition is of less interest.
8. While the argument assumes that Â b Ä Â s , and Â s Â b , these assumptions can be eliminated by noting any agent of type below Â Á max ® Â s ; Â b¯r eceives an object with probability zero, so is therefore indistinguishable from type Â , and any agent of type above Â Á min°Â s ; Â b ± receives an object with probability one, so is therefore indistinguishable from type Â. Therefore, the pro t in the mechanism must be the same as if both agents' types were instead distributed on the same interval h Â ; Â i (with possible atoms at its endpoints), in which case ef cient bargaining is impossible by the argument in the text.
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Preprint prepared on 29 August 2016 using jeea.cls v1.0. reservation utilities O V i . / that ensures, on the one hand, the existence of ef cient optout types, and, on the other hand, nonemptiness of the marginal core, thus enabling the application of Proposition 1 to show impossibility of ef cient bargaining in the simplest and most intuitive way. This speci cation assumes that when an agent i refuses to participate, the remaining agents strike a bargain that maximizes their joint surplus in the absence of agent i. While this speci cation is seemingly at odds with our emphasis on impossibility of ef cient bargaining, for reasons discussed above it proves a useful device for characterizing intermediary pro ts and the possibility of ef cient bargaining.
For one example, consider the double-auction setting of Williams (1999) , in which there are N s sellers with values drawn from a distribution on OEÂ s ; Â s and N b buyers with values drawn from a distribution on
Each seller i owns one unit of the good [thus, property rights specify his consumption O
x i D 1], and each buyer i owns none of the good [thus, property rights specify his consumption O
(The setting of Myerson and Satterthwaite described above is the special case with N s D N b D 1.) As for the functions O V i . /, as suggested above, we assume that agents i trade ef ciently among themselves in the event that agent i opts out. If so, then (i) a buyer of type
Moreover, a competitive equilibrium exists in every state and is not unique with a positive probability. Since a competitive equilibrium is always in the core (and, hence, in the marginal core), Proposition 1 applies whenever both (i) and (ii) hold. 9 Note, in contrast, that the calculation of the intermediary's expected pro t in this double auction setting would be quite involved [see, for example, Williams (1999) ].
The same approach also applies to the setting with a public good, in which each of N consumers' values is drawn from a distribution on OE0; Â , and the cost of provision is c > 0 (which could be assumed to be split equally among participating agents in the default outcome). Consider property rights that specify that when an agent opts out, he does not make any payment and is excluded from the public good. (Clearly, if nonparticipants could sometimes enjoy the public good, this would only strengthen participation constraints and make ef cient bargaining less likely.) As discussed above, without loss of generality we can assume that in this case the other agents choose the 9 . The argument can also be extended to show impossibility whenever N b D N s . In this case, note that in an ef cient allocation any agent of type below Â Á max ® Â s ; Â b¯r eceives an object with probability zero, so is therefore indistinguishable from type Â , and any agent of type above Â Á min°Â s ; Â b
± receives an object with probability one, so is therefore indistinguishable from type Â . Therefore, the pro t in the mechanism must be the same as if all agents' types were instead distributed on the same interval h Â; Â i (with possible atoms at its endpoints), in which case ef cient bargaining is impossible by the argument in the text.
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level of the public good to maximize their joint payoff. In this case, each agent's type 0 is both an ef cient-opt-out type and an adverse type. Since a Lindahl equilibrium exists in every state and is not unique with a positive probability, and a Lindahl equilibrium is in the core (and the marginal core), Proposition 1 applies. 10
Optimal Property Rights for Minimizing the Expected First-Best Subsidy
When the intermediary's expected pro t is negative, ef ciency is impossible absent a subsidy. The expected value of the subsidy required to achieve ef ciency exactly equals , so that minimizing the expected subsidy amounts to maximizing the expected pro t. Recall from Lemma 3 that the intermediary's expected pro t when the adverse ef cient-opt-out property holds for all agents can be written as:
Using this formula we compare property rights possessing this property in terms of this criterion, which in general amounts to maximizing the sum
In the remainder of this section we explore the implications of this prescription.
Two Agents
We rst consider situations with two agents and analyze optimal property rights for an indivisible good. Speci cally, as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) , each agent i's value Â i for the good is drawn from a full support distribution F i on OE0; 1. We rst consider which of the two agents should own the good if the goal is to minimize the expected rst-best bargaining subsidy. We then investigate whether options to own 10 . In the double-auction setting with KN b buyers and KN s sellers, the per-agent expected subsidy in an ex ante optimal mechanism converges to zero as the K ! 1. Intuitively, this relates to the fact that the core converges (in probability) to the unique competitive equilibrium of the continuous limit economy. In the competitive limit, the marginal contribution of a buyer who buys equals his value minus the equilibrium price, while the marginal contribution of a seller who sells equals the equilibrium price minus his cost. Hence, in the limit the agents can fully appropriate their marginal contributions while balancing the budget [as in Makowski and Ostroy (1989 , 2001 ]. This relates to the nding of Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) that the inef ciency in an ex ante optimal budget-balanced mechanism also shrinks to zero as the number of agents grows. In contrast, in the public-good setting considered in the previous paragraph, as N ! 1, the core does not shrink. In the limit, each agent is non-pivotal for the provision of the public good, and so his marginal contribution is his whole value, and for him to receive this marginal contribution he should not contribute anything to the provision cost. Thus, in the limit, ef cient provision would require the full provision cost to be covered by the intermediary. This is consistent with the nding of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) that the for a public good that is excludable (i.e., must be provided to either everybody or nobody), the probability of providing the public good in any budget-balanced mechanism goes to zero as N ! 1.
can improve on simple ownership. This corresponds to the legal literature's question of whether property rules or liability rules are better. 11 
Who Should Own?
Consider any situation with two agents in which the property rights induce a xed status quo . O
x; O t 1 ; : : : ; O t N /, and the two agents both have ef cient-opt-out types. 12 We then have
and, using (9), the expected rst-best subsidy is
In words, a mediator who implements the rst best must subsidize the entire renegotiation surplus. Thus, the status quo O
x that minimizes the expected subsidy (within a class of those that have ef cient-opt-out types) must maximize the expected status quo surplus
Suppose that the assumptions of Lemma 1(ii) hold and there are two agents. Then, the among the property rights mechanisms that induce a fixed status quo and cause both agents to have efficient-opt-out types, the one that minimizes the first-best subsidy is the one that maximizes the two agents' joint payoff in the absence of bargaining.
Since, as we saw in Section 3, both agents have ef cient-opt-out types in the setting of Myerson and Satterthwaite, where O
x i is either 0 or 1, we have the following corollary: 13 C 1. Consider the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting in which each of two agents i D 1; 2 has value Â i 2 OE0; 1 drawn from a full support distribution F i . Then assigning ownership to the agent with the higher expected value minimizes the first-best subsidy. 11 . In Section 6 we also discuss "dual chooser" rules in settings with two agents.
12.
Recall that with a xed status quo, any ef cient-opt-out type is trivially also an adverse type. 13 . In contrast, ef cient-opt-out types do not exist for interior property rights O
x i 2 .0; 1/. Indeed, for some such O
x ef ciency can be achieved [Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) , Segal and Whinston (2011), Loertscher and Wasser (2014)], and this O
x would not be optimal in the absence of bargaining, in contrast to the conclusion of Proposition 2.
Thus, to minimize the rst-best bargaining subsidy, ownership is best assigned exactly as if bargaining were impossible.
Property Rules vs. Liability Rules.
We now consider the possibility that instead of a simple property right, one agent may be given an option to own. Speci cally, imagine that agent 1 can choose to acquire the good from agent 2 at a price p. This arrangement may be thought of as a liability rule in which agent 1 can take the good from agent 2, but must then make damage payment p to agent 2. For simplicity, we assume that both agents' type distributions have full support and are overlapping.
As we saw in Example 1, both agents will have adverse ef cient-opt-out types in this case. For agent 2 it is his type O
The marginal core in this case is nonempty and is multivalued in any state Â in which O
that is, whenever the exercise decision by type Â 1 is not ef cient. Hence, by Proposition 1, ef ciency cannot be achieved with a liability rule.
To identify the subsidy-minimizing liability rule, we write the intermediary's pro t as
Observe that the rst term is the expected welfare loss from agent 1's optimal exercise of the option. It is negative since agent 1's exercise decision is not always ex post optimal. However, the inef ciency is uniquely minimized when p D EOEÂ 2 , which is the optimal exercise price in the absence of bargaining [since it sets the exercise price equal to the expected externality imposed by the option's exercise; see Kaplow and Shavell (1996) ]. The second term, on the other hand, is non-positive by de nition of O Â 1 (an adverse type for agent 1) and is zero when p D EOEÂ 2 , since then agent 2 is indifferent, on average, about agent 1's exercise decision. Thus, we see that when agent 1 has the option, the option price that minimizes the rst-best subsidy is p D EOEÂ 2 , and it results in a positive expected subsidy (con rming that achieving the rst best is impossible, as implied by Proposition 1). 14 This option price corresponds exactly to the traditional legal liability rule in which the damage payment equals the victim's expected damage.
Next, consider which agent should have the option. When agent i gets the option and p D EOEÂ i , the rst-best subsidy exactly equals the welfare loss from agent i's optimal exercise of the option in the absence of bargaining. Hence, the agent i should 14. Che (2006) also derives this result and notes the impossibility of two agents achieving ef ciency under a liability rule.
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Finally, since the case of a simple property right corresponds to setting p D 0 or p D 1, the optimal liability rule is strictly better than the best simple property right, exactly as in the case without bargaining.
In summary:
In the Myerson and Satterthwaite setting in which agents' type distributions have full support, the option-to-own (i.e., liability rule) that minimizes the expected first-best bargaining subsidy sets the option price equal to the nonchooser's ("victim's") expected value ("harm") and assigns the option to the agent whose optimal exercise in the absence of bargaining results in the greatest expected surplus. The resulting expected subsidy is lower than it is with any simple property right.
More than Two Agents
When there are more than two agents, choosing the subsidy-minimizing property rights requires that we consider the coalitional, rather than individual, values. For example, shifting the property right to a private good (generating no externalities) from one agent to another is ef ciency enhancing in the absence of bargaining if it increases the joint payoff of the two agents. In contrast, this change increases ef ciency when bargaining is possible (in the sense of reducing the expected rst-best subsidy) if it reduces the sum of these agents' marginal contributions to the total surplus. 15 We illustrate the new effects through two examples.
Application: Spectrum
Licenses. Consider the following example: Simple property rights to two spectrum licenses, L 1 and L 2 , are to be allocated among three rms. Firms 1 and 2 are specialists and each rm i D 1; 2 has a value Â i for license L i , drawn from a full-support distribution on R C with mean , and no value for the other license. Firm G is a generalist rm, and has a value Â G for both licenses, and value Â G for just one of the licenses, where Â G is drawn from a full-support distribution on R C with mean G , and 2 .0; 1/: The values Â 1 , Â 2 , and Â G are independent random variables. When < 1=2, the licenses are complements for G; when > 1=2, they are substitutes. For example, the licenses might be in two different regions, with rms 1 and 2 being regional rms and rm G being a national rm. In that case, G is likely to nd the two licenses complements ( < 1=2). Alternatively, the licenses might be to different frequencies, with rms 1 and 2 each having a product that can use one of 15 . This effect can therefore be interpreted as the effect on the two agents' joint payoff in bargaining, if this bargaining permits each agent to extract his marginal contribution to the grand coalition. This relates to the analysis of Segal (2003) ; however, the latter considers the Shapley value, in which agents receive weighted combinations of their marginal contributions to different coalitions, hence the results are not directly comparable.
Journal of the European Economic Association
the frequencies effectively, while rm G may have two products, each of which would use one of the two frequencies. In that case, the frequencies may be substitutes for rm G ( > 1=2).
We will compare an allocation of BOTH licenses to G with an allocation of NONE of the licenses to G and license L i to specialist rm i. Absent bargaining, the expected surplus is larger at BOTH than at NONE if
Note that the best choice between these two allocations of property rights in the absence of bargaining is independent of . Now consider the subsidy-minimizing property rights when there is bargaining. The following table summarizes the coalitional values, under the assumption that each two-agent coalition maximizes its joint payoff:
Under both of these property rights allocations, the adverse ef cient-opt-out property holds. 16 Using expression (7) , BOTH is better than NONE if 17
which can be rewritten as
Thus, bargaining changes the optimal property rights according to the sign of the term on the right-hand side of (11). This term equals zero when D 1=2, so that the licenses are neither substitutes nor complements for rm G. In that case, the best property rights allocation is the same as in the absence of bargaining. The derivative of the right-hand 16 . For this conclusion, it is essential that types are unbounded above. If we imposed upper bounds on types, the qualitative results would still hold provided that the bounds are high enough, but these results could no longer be established using our methods.
17. Under either property rights allocation there is a competitive equilibrium in which the price of each license i is Â i , and there exist additional competitive equilibria with nearby prices as long as the ef cient allocation is unique. Since all competitive equilibria yield core payoff pro les, the core is always nonempty and is multi-valued with probability 1, so by Proposition 1 ef cient bargaining is impossible under either property rights allocation.
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Thus, when > 1=2 (substitutes), bargaining pushes the optimal property rights toward NONE, and when < 1=2 (complements) bargaining pushes the optimal property rights toward BOTH.
Application: Liability Rule for Pollution.
Consider a setting in which agent 0 (the " rm") chooses whether to pollute, labeled by x 2 ¹0; 1º. The rm's utility is v 0 .x; Â 0 / D Â 0 x, where Â 0 2 R C denotes its value for polluting. Agents i D 1; : : : ; N are consumers, whose utilities are given by
Ef cient pollution is therefore given by
We assume that, for all i, Q Â i has a full-support on R C that has a density (i.e., is absolutely continuous).
The property rights are given by a liability rule: the rm can choose to pollute, in which case it must pay pre-speci ed "damages" p i 0 to each consumer i 1. Thus, if the rm does not participate in bargaining, it optimally chooses O x 0 .Â/ D .Â 0 ; p 1 ; : : : p N /, and its transfer is given by O 0 .Â/ D P i p i O x 0 .Â/ : We must also specify what happens if agent i 1 does not participate. To obtain the results in the simplest possible way, we assume for now that all the other agents then bargain ef ciently among each other, given that agent i must be paid compensation p i if pollution is chosen. Thus, they optimally choose pollution level
(We discuss the role of this assumption in Remark 1 below.) Given these assumptions, each agent i 1 has an ef cient-opt-out type Â ı i D p i . This type is also trivially adverse, since the agent imposes no externalities on the others. Hence, by Lemma 2, it is agent i's critical type.
The rm, on the other hand, has two ef cient-opt-out types: Â 0 D 0 (which never pollutes in the rst best and does not pollute when it does not participate) and Â 0 D C1 (which always pollutes in the rst best and pollutes when it does not participate). Furthermore, Â 0 D 0 is an adverse type if
is an adverse type if the inequality is reversed. (Of course, formally speaking Â 0 D C1 is not a "type," but taking a sequence Â k 0 ! C1 shows that the rm does satisfy the adverse ef cient-opt-out property.)
Finally, it is easy to see that the marginal core is nonempty-valued and multi-valued with a positive probability. Hence, Proposition 1 implies that ef cient bargaining is impossible. 
Since type Â i D p i was agent i' s critical type above, where ef cient bargaining was impossible, the participation constraints of this type continue to imply that ef cient bargaining is impossible.
Furthermore, we can argue that if the intermediary can choose O x i .Â/ following nonparticipation of agent i 1 to minimize the expected rst-best subsidy, then it can do no better than setting O x i .Â/ D .p i ; Â i /, as we assumed above: Indeed, since the intermediary has to satisfy the participation constraint of type Â i D p i regardless of O x i .Â/, formula (7) bounds below the intermediary's expected subsidy. On the other hand, by choosing O x i .Â/ D .p i ; Â i / the intermediary ensures that type Â i D p i is a critical type, and therefore its participation constraints imply all the other types' participation constraints, so the lower bound on the expected subsidy is actually achieved. Therefore, the following analysis of optimal damages p applies to the situation where the intermediary can choose O x i .Â/ optimally following nonparticipation by individual agents. Now we identify the vector of damages p D .p 1 ; ::; p N / that minimizes the expected rst-best subsidy. Using (7) , the maximization problem can be written as max p 1 ;::;p N 0
3 5 for i 1:
Note that using the Envelope Theorem, for i 1,
Therefore, at the optimum we must have P i 1 p i D P i 1 EOE Q Â i , i.e., the total damages paid by the rm should equal the total expectation damages for the affected parties. This would also be optimal in a setting where bargaining is impossible.
However, in contrast to the setting without bargaining, it now matters how the damages are allocated among consumers. The problem of optimal allocation of damages can be formulated as
Note that by (12) , @EOE O V i .p i ; Q Â i /=@p i is nondecreasing in p i , so the objective function is convex, and is therefore maximized at a vertex of the feasible set, i.e., a point p such that
Thus, all of the damages should be paid to a single consumer, with the consumer selected to maximize the total expected surplus of the N 1 coalitions consisting of the rm and N 2 affected parties. 18 
Optimal Property Rights with Second-Best Bargaining
In many circumstances, there isn't an intermediary available to subsidize trade. In that case, a more appropriate approach to determining optimal property rights involves looking at second-best mechanisms that maximize expected surplus subject to a budget balance constraint. Analyzing that problem, however, is complicated by the interplay between the mechanism chosen and the agents' critical types: those critical types depend on the mechanism being employed, but the best mechanism depends on the agent's critical types (because they determine which IR constraints bind). 19 In this section, we analyze this problem. As this is a much harder problem than the rst-best problem studied earlier, we restrict attention to the case of two agents trading a single indivisible good, where those agents' types are independently distributed on OE0; 1. 20 Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) characterized the optimal second-best mechanism for the case of simple property rights, where one agent is a seller (the 18. As we have seen, when N D 1 ef ciency is impossible. However, when N > 1, ef ciency may be possible at the optimal property rights. For example, this is the case when the dsitribution of each victim i's value Â i is concentrated around its mean, EOE Q Â i , while the distribution of Â 0 is disperse. This can be veri ed by checking that the mediator's rst-best pro t given by (7) is positive. 19 . For any mechanism, not just VCG mechanisms, we now refer to an agent's "critical type" as a type that has the smallest participation surplus among all of the agent's types. 20 . The restriction to OE0; 1 is just a normalization.
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Preprint prepared on 29 August 2016 using jeea.cls v1.0. Figure 1 : The second-best optimal (Myerson-Satterthwaite) mechanism when agent 1 (the buyer) and agent 2 (the seller) both have values that are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. F 1. The second-best optimal (Myerson-Satterthwaite) mechanism when agent 1 (the buyer) and agent 2 (the seller) both have values that are uniformly distributed on the interval OE0; 1 .
initial owner) and the other agent is the buyer. The optimal mechanism when agent 2 is the seller and agents' types are uniformly distributed is shown in Figure 1 [the shaded region shows the type pro les .Â 1 ; Â 2 / at which agent 1 ends up getting the good], which leads to a surplus loss of 7=64 (from the rst-best surplus of 3=4). It involves a trading "gap" l D 1=4, which represents the amount that the buyer's value must exceed the seller's value for trade to occur. Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) showed that the rst best is achievable for a convex set of intermediate property rights if dividing or randomizing property rights is possible [see also Segal and Whinston (2011) ]. However, when divided or randomized property rights are not possible, it may be possible to improve upon simple undivided property rights with more complex property rights mechanisms. In the remainder of this section, we examine this possibility for liability rules.
Characterization of the Second-best Bargaining Mechanism for a Given Liability Rule
Without loss of generality, we will take the agent who possesses the option to have the good to be agent 1 (the "active agent"); agent 2 is the "passive agent" or "victim." Note that if p D 0 then agent 1 will always exercise his option in the default, so this liability rule is equivalent to agent 1 being the owner with a simple property right. If, instead, p D 1, then agent 1 will never exercise his option, so the liability rule is then equivalent to agent 2 being the owner with a simple property right. Hence, the optimal liability rule cannot be worse than the optimal simple property right. However, we will see that there are always some liability rules that are worse than the best simple property right. Our analysis hinges on identifying critical types. For the passive agent 2, any type Â p 2 whose probability of trade in the mechanism is p, equal to the probability of trade in the default, is a critical type. To see this fact, observe that type Â p 2 's participation surplus simply equals the difference in its expected transfer when participating in the mechanism and when opting out. Any other type Â 0 2 can guarantee the same participation surplus by pretending to be type Â p 2 when participating in the mechanism. Thus, if type Â p 2 is willing to participate, then so is every type. In general, as we will see, there will be an interval of types Â 2 ; N Â 2 who will trade with probability p in the mechanism, all of whom will be critical.
As for the active agent 1, we observe that this agent's critical types always include either O Â 1 D 0, or O Â 1 D 1, or both. To see this, observe that in the default outcome this agent's payoff is O V 1 .Â 1 / D max¹Â 1 p; 0º, which is a convex function whose derivative is 0 below p and 1 above p. This agent's expected payoff U 1 .Â 1 / in any mechanism, on the other hand, has a derivative that equals that type's expected probability of receiving the good in the mechanism, so U 0 In what follows, we consider the general case in which the c.d.f.'s of the two agents' types are F 1 ; F 2 respectively, with strictly positive densities f 1 ; f 2 . For i D 1; 2, and for 2 OE0; 1 let
denote agent i's virtual values when his downward/upward ICs bind. We assume that both ! i . j1/ and N ! i . j1/ are strictly increasing and continuous functions in Â i (this implies the same properties for any 2 OE0; 1). Note that In our characterization, the weight will equal 0 when Â 1 D 0 is a critical type for agent 1 (so that his downward IC constraints bind), and will equal 1 when Â 1 D 1 is a critical type (so that agent 1's upward incentive constraints bind). We can have 2 .0; 1/ when both of these types are critical for agent 1. Finally, for 2 OE0; 1 and 2 OE0; 1, de ne N Â 1 .Â 2 j ; / Á ! 1 1 . N ! 2 .Â 2 j /j ; / and Â 1 .Â 2 j ; / Á ! 1 1 .! 2 .Â 2 j /j ; /. Given agent 2's type Â 2 , and values and , these are the types of agent 1 at which agent 1's weighted virtual valuation equals agent 2's upward and downward virtual values, respectively. They will form part of the boundary of the set of type pro les at which agent 1 gets the good in the optimal mechanism, and are depicted in Figure 2 . Under our assumptions they are both continuous increasing functions and N Â 1 .Â 2 j ; / Â 1 .Â 2 j ; / for all Â 2 . We begin with the following characterization result (all proofs for results in this section are in the Appendix):
When there is a liability rule in which agent 1 has the option to own in return for a payment of p 2 OE0; 1, the second-best solution takes the following form (with probability 1): For some fixed > 0 and 2 OE0; 1,
Furthermore,
In Figure 2 , the function O Â 1 .Â 2 / de ned in (14) , which forms the boundary of the region in which agent 1 gets the good in the mechanism, is shown in heavy trace.
Condition (15) re ects agent 1's IR constraint. Under the liability rule, agent 1's utility is exactly 1 p larger when he is type 1 than when he is type 0. On the other hand, the difference in expected payoffs for types Â 1 D 1 and Â 1 D 0 equals 1 EOE O Â 1 . Q Â 2 / in the mechanism. 21 Thus, type Â 1 D 0 must be a critical type for agent
Second-best Surplus Given Option Price p

Uniformly Distributed Types.
For the speci c case in which both agents' types are drawn from the uniform distribution, Lemma 4 implies that the second-best mechanism takes the following form: P 4. When both agents' types are drawn from the uniform distribution and there is a liability rule in which agent 1 has the option to own in return for a payment of p 2 OE0; 1, the optimal second-best allocation rule takes the following form, for some function l.p/: 22 • For p < 3=8: x 1 .Â 1 ; Â 2 / D 1 if and only if (i) min¹Â 1 ; pº Â 2 , (ii) Â 1 p and Â 2 2 OEp; p C l.p/, or (iii) Â 1 Â 2 l.p/ and Â 2 > p C l.p/; 21. To see this, observe that by the Envelope Theorem, this difference in expected payoffs in the mechanism equals
But, reversing the order of integration, this can be rewritten as
22. We describe the function l.p/ in the proof of the proposition, contained in the Appendix.
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• For p 2 OE3=8; 5=8: x 1 .Â 1 ; Â 2 / D 1 if and only if (i) Â 1 Â 2 C p 3=8 and Â 2 < 3=8, (ii) Â 1 p and Â 2 2 OE3=8; 5=8; or (iii) Â 1 Â 2 C p 5=8 and Â 2 > 5=8; • For p > 5=8: x 1 .Â 1 ; Â 2 / D 1 if and only if (i) Â 1 Â 2 p, (ii) Â 1 p and Â 2 2 OEp; p l.p/, or (iii) Â 1 Â 2 C l.p/ and Â 2 < p l.p/. Figures 3-5 show the sets of types for which agent 1 receives the good for the three cases identi ed in Proposition 4. The three cases correspond to situations in which agent 1's critical type is O Â 1 D 1 (for p < 3=8), O Â 1 D 0 (for p > 5=8), and both types 0 and 1 are critical types (for p 2 OE3=8; 5=8). Note that the critical type is 1 (resp. 0) for low (resp. high) p, which are cases where the property right is relatively close to agent 1 (resp. 2) having a simple ownership right. 23 The "gap" function l.p/ is similar to the Myerson-Satterthwaite gap seen in Figure 1 , and, like that gap, its size is set to achieve budget balance.
The second-best expected surplus as a function of p can be derived analytically in the case in which both agents' values are uniformly distributed (see the Appendix for its derivation). Figure 6 graphs the resulting second-best inef ciency as a function of p. For comparison, the gure also shows the inef ciency with no bargaining and the de cit for a planner who would subsidize trade to achieve the rst best. As can be seen in the gure, the optimal property right has p D 1=2 -equal to the expected value of the passive agent -in all three cases.
General Distributions.
While the optimal second-best p with uniformly distributed types for both agents is the same as when bargaining is not possible and as when there is an intermediary willing to subsidize trade, Figure 6 shows one signi cant difference between the second-best case and these others: the surplus achievable with a liability rule is not monotone increasing as p moves toward 1=2, and is in fact lower for p close to 0 (resp. 1) than at p D 0 (resp. 1). That is, a slightly interior p is worse than the simple property right it is near. 24 The fact that liability rules which induce default allocations close to but different from a simple property right are worse than that simple property right does not depend on our assumption of a uniform distribution. As the following proposition shows, it is true for any distributions of values for the two agents: Figure 3 : The second-best mechanism for p < 3/8 when both agents' values are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].
F
3. The second-best mechanism for p < 3=8 when both agents' values are uniformly distributed on the interval OE0; 1.
P
5. There exists a ı > 0 such that any liability rule with p 2 OE1; 1 ı (resp, p 2 OE0; ı) has a lower second-best expected surplus than p D 1 (resp. p D 0), which is equivalent to simple ownership by agent 2 (resp. agent 1).
To understand Proposition 5, note that starting at p D 1 a small reduction in p weakly increases the default payoff of every type of the active agent 1. At the same time, it increases the expected payoff in the default to essentially all types of the passive agent 2 (whose default payoff when p D 1 simply equals his type), since he then gains .p Â 2 /OE1 F 1 .p/. 25 Thus, this change tightens IR constraints, reducing the achievable second-best surplus. 25 . The complication in the proof is that this is not true for type Â 2 D 1 (or types near it for p < 1). 4. The second-best mechanism for 3=8 < p < 5=8 when both agents' values are uniformly distributed on the interval OE0; 1.
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We have also explored computationally (using Lemma 4) a range of cases in which the two agents' values are drawn from differing distributions. In general, it is not the case that the optimal option price p equals the victim's expected harm, EOE Q Â 2 . For example, when the active agent's (agent 1) value has density f 1 .Â 1 / D 0:2 C 1:6.Â 1 / while the passive agent's (agent 2) value is uniformly distributed, searching over p 2 OE0:45; 0:55 in increments of 0.001 yields the optimal option price p D 0:516. The expected surplus at this p is 0.726996, compared to the expected surplus of 0.726881 when p D 0:5 D EOE Q Â 2 . 26 Interestingly, just as in this example, in all of the cases we 26 . As a check that this nding is not a result of computational imprecisions, we also examined the case in which we switched the two agents value distributions, as well as other cases with a uniformly distributed
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have computed, the optimal option price p is extremely close to the victim's expected harm and the loss from setting instead p D EOE Q Â 2 is very small. 27 value for agent 1. For such cases, we know that the optimal p in fact equals EOEÂ 2 (see Lemma A.1 in the Appendix). Our computational algorithm yields an optimal p exactly equal to EOEÂ 2 in all of these cases. 27 . We have computed solutions for a set of cases in which each agent i 's value distribution has density 
Dual-Chooser Rules
For another application, in this section we consider whether "dual-chooser" rules, as described by Ayres (2005) , can improve upon simple property rights or liability rules when there are two agents. In a dual chooser rule, one agent (we will assume agent 2) is the initial owner of the good, but the other agent can get it if both agents agree to this at a pre-speci ed price p. We assume that each agent uses his dominant strategy of agreeing to trade if and only if it yields nonnegative pro ts.
We assume that both agents' values for the good are independently drawn from the same interval, which we normalize to be OE0; 1. Our rst observation is that with this property rights mechanism, agent 2's type O Â 2 D 1 is an adverse ef cient-opt-out type, while agent 1's type O Â 1 D 0 is an adverse ef cient-opt-out type (these types never trade, either in the default mechanism or in the ef cient mechanism). Since these types have the same reservation utilities as in the standard Myerson-Satterthwaite setting in which agent 2 is the owner, we see immediately that the expected rst-best subsidy is the same as in the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting, regardless of p.
As for the second-best expected surplus, observe that for no p can it exceed that in the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting where agent 2 has a simple property right because, for any p, the participation constraints of types O Â 2 D 1 and O Â 1 D 0 must still be satis ed, and the reservation utilities of these types are the same as in the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting. On the other hand, the second-best expected surplus can be strictly lower than in the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting. For example, P 6. If Q Â 1 ; Q Â 2 U OE0; 1, then the Myerson-Satterthwaite mechanism fails to satisfy IR for any dual-chooser rule with posted price p 2 0; 1 2 [ 1 2 ; 1 .
Proof. Consider rst agent 1. His expected utility in the dual-chooser rule is O
.Â 1 p/ pº, while his expected utility in the Myerson-Satterthwaite mechanism is O V 1 .Â 1 / D .Â 1 1=4/ 2 C =2 (this can be calculated either from the dominant-strategy "pricing" implementation of this allocation rule, or by the integral formula using the allocation rule). So clearly for p < 1=4, the IR of Â 1 D 1=4 will fail. For 1=4 Ä p < 1=2, consider instead type Â 1 D p C 1=4 (this will actually be the "critical type"). For this type the participation surplus is p 2 =2 p=4 D p .p 1=2/ =2 < 0. Now consider agent 2. His expected utility in the dual-chooser rule is O
So clearly for p > 3=4, the IR of Â 2 D 3=4 will fail. For 1=2 < p Ä 3=4, consider type Â 2 D p 1=4 (this will actually be the "critical type"). For this type the participation surplus is .
We see then that when bargaining under asymmetric information will take place (of the form we have considered), dual chooser rules cannot improve upon simple property rights, and can be worse. (They must therefore also be weakly worse than the best liability rule.) This can be contrasted with the case in which bargaining is impossible, where for any p 2 .0; 1/ the surplus is strictly higher under a dual chooser rule than under a simple property right.
Conclusion
The critical role of property rights for economic ef ciency has long been recognized. In this article, we shed new light on this role by examining how property rights affect ef ciency when agents will bargain under conditions of asymmetric information.
Our results have implications for several literatures. Relative to the theoretical mechanism design literature, we provide a new set of suf cient conditions characterizing when ef ciency through bargaining is impossible, which applies not only to the traditional case of simple property rights, but also to more general property rights mechanisms. We then show how ef ciency is affected by the property rights allocation in such cases.
In organizational economics, losses due to ex post bargaining inef ciencies were a central theme of Williamson's Transaction Cost Economics approach to the rm. One can view our analysis, in which we study how property rights can affect those losses, as taking the Grossman-Hart-Moore [Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart (1995)] Property Rights Theory approach of asking how asset ownership affects ef ciency, but doing so focusing instead on Williamson's costs of haggling, rather than on inef ciencies in ex ante investments. Like the Property Rights Theory, our approach has implications not only for asset ownership, but also for allocation of decision rights within rms.
Finally, in the legal literature, ever since Calabresi and Melamed (1972) , scholars have been interested in the performance of different property rights regimes. Our results shed new light on this issue when bargaining is imperfect due to the presence of asymmetric information. In particular, we have highlighted the effect that bargaining has on the choice among property rights regimes, relative to the case in which bargaining is impossible.
Appendix: Appendix: Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 4
Note than in any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, agent 2's expected consumption 1 EOEx 1 . Q Â 1 ; Â 2 / must be nondecreasing in Â 2 , therefore there will be a type O Â 2 such that°1
Consider the designer's "relaxed problem" in which she chooses O Â 2 , the allocation rule x . /, and interim expected utilities U 1 . /, U 2 . / to maximize expected surplus subject to (A.1), expected budget balance, rst-order incentive compatibility (ICFOC), agent 1's participation constraints IR 1 .0/ and IR 1 .1/, and agent 2's participation constraint IR 2 . O Â 2 /. 28 The Lagrangian for this problem (leaving ICFOC as constraints) is
It is easy to see that > 0 (since the rst-best is impossible), while 0 ; 1 0 must satisfy the complementary slackness conditions
28. By standard arguments that adjust the transfer rule [e.g., Lemma 1 in Segal and Whinston (2011)], ex ante budget balance can be strengthened to ex post budget balance without affecting expected surplus or any of the other constraints. Moreover, provided that the allocation rule is monotone, all IC and IR constraints will be satis ed for the reasons stated in text. and ı . / 0 must satisfy the complementary slackness conditions
Proof. Note that the solution must have D (otherwise we could raise the Lagrangian by adding a constant to U 2 . / without affecting ICFOC), and 0 C 1 D (otherwise we could raise the Lagrangian by adding a constant to U 1 . / without affecting ICFOC). Hence, we can rewrite the Lagrangian as
Note also that we can always satisfy one of the complementary slackness conditions (A.2) by adding a constant to U 1 . /. To be able to satisfy both of them at the same time while satisfying IR 1 .1/ and IR 1 .0/, we need to be in one of the following three cases:
For now, x O Â 2 and consider maximizing with respect to the allocation rule x 1 . / the simpli ed Lagrangian (which drops all terms not involving the allocation rule)
Now using ICFOC and integration by parts, dividing by 1 C ; and letting O Á = .1 C /, O ı .Â 2 / Á ı .Â 2 / = .1 C / and Á 1 = , this simpli ed Lagrangian can be rewritten as
It is maximized pointwise by a solution of the form (13), where 
Thus, the solution takes the form
This characterizes the solution of the relaxed problem subject to (A. (14) .
The complementary slackness conditions (A.2) are given by (15) , since by ICFOC and Fubini's Theorem
(A.6) Finally, note that the constructed solution actually satis es all the incentive constraints (since for each i, E Q Â i x i OE.Â i ; Q Â i / is nondecreasing in Â i ) and all of the participation constraints (by the argument in the text before the proposition).
We now describe a transfer rule that implements the allocation rule above in a dominant strategy IC mechanism that has the right participation constraints binding. When < 1, i.e., IR 1 .0/ binds, we let t 1 .
, agent 1 pays O Â 1 .Â 2 / when he consumes the object. 29 When > 0, i.e., IR 1 .1/ binds, we let
, agent 1 rst takes the object at p and then is paid O Â 1 .Â 2 / when he gives it up. 30 For 2 .0; 1/, by (15) the two payments have the same expectation over Â 2 for every Â 2 . In particular, in that case we can elect the rst option for t 1 when Â 1 < p and the second option when Â 1 > p, yielding transfer rule
As for agent 2, we let
That is, if agent 1 would not exercise his option at the default, then agent 2 receives Â 2 Â 1 j O ; Á whenever he sells the object, while if agent 1 would exercise his option at the default, then agent 2 receives p but pays back N Â 2 Â 1 j O ; Á whenever he ends up keeping the object. 31 Adding the two transfer rules (A.7) and (A.8) yields a budget de cit of
A.2. Proof of Proposition 4
When F 1 ; F 2 are uniform distributions on OE0; 1,
Then we have
where l D .1 / = .1 C / and N l D = .1 C /.
A.2.1. Only IR 1 .0/ Binds. Now consider the relaxed problem in which we ignore IR 1 .1/. The solution to that problem corresponds to the case in which D 0, hence N l D 0: Let l D l D = .1 C /. We can use the following transfer for agent 1:
Given these transfers, the budget de cit is then Focusing rst on the region where p < Â 1 < Â 2 , the subsidy there is the whole gains from trade Â 2 Â 1 . Since the ef cient expected gains from trade in the M-S model with U OE0; 1 2 distribution is 1/6, the expected gains from trade on the region p < Â 1 < Â 2 is .1 p/ 3 =6 (the probabilities and the gains themselves are scaled by 1 p). 32 Now, in the region Â 2 C l < Â 1 < p, the subsidy Â 1 Â 2 2l can be interpreted as (a) paying the gains from trade as if agent 1's value were Â 1 l and trade were ef cient for that value, and then (b) getting back l on every trade that happened. In expectation, (a) yields .p l/ 3 =6, and (b) yields l .p l/ 2 =2. 33 
Requiring ex ante budget balance sets this expression to 0. We want to express l as a function of p, but it's easier to do the reverse. The two roots of the quadratic equation in p are: p˙.l/ D 1 l .1 l/˙1 3
In Figure A. 1, the two solutions are graphed as the dotted and the solid curve, respectively. Combining the two curves yields the graph of function l .p/, which is inverse U-shaped. IR 1 .1/ is satis ed when EOE O Â 1 .Â 2 / Ä p; i.e., p l 1 p, or p .1 C l/ =2. In Figure A .1, the lower boundary of the region in which IR 1 .1/ is satis ed is described by the dashed line. The intersection of the dashed line with the solid curve solves the equation p .l/ D .1 C l/ =2, which yields l D 1=4 and p D p .l/ D 5=8. Thus, the solution to the relaxed problem in which only IR 1 .0/ is imposed satis es IR 1 .1/, and is therefore the solution of the true problem, if and only if p 5=8. This describes the third case listed in Proposition 4.
Expected Welfare Loss. The expected welfare loss when p 5=8 can be calculated as p 3 =6 .p l/ 3 =6 l .p l/ 2 =2 D 1 6 l 2 .3p 2l/ : 32. In general, the Myerson-Satterthwaite de cit with uniform distributions on OE0; 1 and a "gap" equal to l is .1 4l/.1 l/ 2 =6 [see Myerson and Satterhwaite (1983, p. 277) ]. So when l D 0, the de cit is 1/6. We get .1 p/ 3 =6 because the probability of being in the region p < Â 1 < Â 2 is .1 p/ 2 and the region is OE0; 1 2 scaled down by .1 p/.
33. Alternatively, the region max¹Â 1 ; Â 2 º < p is a scaled-down version of a Myerson-Satterthwaite OE0; 1 2 trading box with a "gap" equal to l=p. Using the formula in footnote 32, the Myerson-Satterthwaite de cit would be .1 4l=p/.1 l=p/=6. The probability of an outcome in this region is p 2 and the de cit is scaled down by p, so this region contributes .p 4l/.p l/=6 to the expected de cit. By (15) , EOE O Â 1 . Q Â 2 / D p. This implies that the probabilities of the two regions A Á ¹Â W Â 2 C l < Â 1 < pº and B Á ¹Â W p < Â 1 < Â 2 N lº are equal (these are the two regions in which the nal allocation differs from what would happen if agent 1 simply exercised his option optimally). This involves having N l D l C .1 2p/. Consider rst the case of p D 1=2. In this case, regions A and B have equal probability when l D N l. The optimal allocation in this case can be interpreted as separate Myerson-Satterthwaite mechanisms for the cases Â 1 ; Â 2 < 1=2 (in which agent 1 is the buyer) and Â 1 ; Â 2 > 1=2 (in which agent 1 is the seller), with no crosssubsidization between the two cases. The unique gap that achieves budget balance and maximizes expected surplus is half of the Myerson-Satterthwaite gap: l D N l D 1=2 1=4 D 1=8: For other p 2 .3=8; 5=8/, we characterize the solution with the help of the following lemma (which holds for arbitrary distribution of agent 2's type, as long as agent 1's type is uniformly distributed): L A.1. Suppose that agent 1's type Â 1 is uniformly distributed and let O Â 1 .Â 2 jp/ describe the second-best allocation rule given p [as specified in (4) ]. Then, if for any Journal of the European Economic Association Preprint prepared on 29 August 2016 using jeea.cls v1.0. p and p 0 both IR 1 .0/ and IR 1 .1/ bind in the optimal second-best mechanism, then O Â 1 .Â 2 jp 0 / D O Â 1 .Â 2 jp/ C .p 0 p/.
Proof. De ne the two regions A p Á ¹Â 2 OE0; 1 2 W Â 1 2 . O Â 1 .Â 2 jp/; p/º and B p Á ¹Â 2 OE0; 1 2 W Â 1 2 .p; O Â 1 .Â 2 jp//º. By (15) , the probabilities of these two regions must be equal (these are the two regions in which the nal allocation differs from what would happen if agent 1 simply exercised his option optimally). Observe that with a constant shift in O Â 1 .Â 2 / budget balance is preserved: For every state Â in region A p , the de cit is now exactly ı smaller, while for every state Â in region B p , the de cit is now exactly ı larger. Given the uniform distribution of Â 1 and the fact that we integrate in each case over the same sets of Â 2 , this change has no effect on the expected de cit. Thus, if O Â 1 .Â 2 jp/ maximizes expected surplus with budget balance under default p, then O Â 1 .Â 2 jp 0 / D O Â 1 .Â 2 jp/ C .p 0 p/ must do so under default p 0 .
The lemma yields the optimal solution for the second case listed in Proposition 4. The lemma also implies that the optimal mechanism in the region in which both IR 1 .0/ and IR 1 .1/ bind has a constant improvement in expected surplus over the expected surplus arising at the default, when agent 1 exercises his option optimally. Since the latter expected surplus is maximized at p D E h Q Â 2 i , so is the former (note that this holds for arbtrary distribution of Q Â 2 ).
A.3. Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the Myerson-Satterthwaite solution, which corresponds to the case of p D 1 and D 0 of Lemma 4. Let 1 denote the Lagrange multiplier on expected budget balance in this solution, and let O 1 Á 1 =.1 C 1 /. Now, x the option price p and a type O Â 2 and consider the program R.p; O Â 2 / of choosing the allocation rule, the utility mappings U 1 . / and U 2 . /, and the "ironing point p" [which affects the solution through constraint (A.1)] to maximize expected surplus plus 1 times expected revenue subject to only IR 2 . O Â 2 /, IR 1 .0/, ICFOC, and constraint (A.1), with optimization being over the allocation rule x 1 . / and p 2 h O Â 2 ; 1 i .
We will rst show that there is a type O Â 2 2 Â 2 .1/ ; 1 such that the solution has p D 1 and the same allocation rule as in the Myerson-Satterthwaite solution. Thus, this program achieves the Myerson-Satterthwaite expected surplus, and, if p D 1, satis es expected budget balance. Moreover, it also satis es IR 2 .Â 2 / for all Â 2 as well as monotonicity (and thus, global IC). Thus, the value of program R.1; O Â 2 / is exactly the second-best (Myerson-Satterthwaite) expected surplus.
To see this, observe that by arguments in the proof of Lemma 4, the solution takes the form described by (13) and therefore
The second integral is strictly negative [since N ! 2 ; 1/ exceeds the value achieved if instead the ironing point p is set equal to p 0 (by the argument above), which in turn exceeds the value that is achieved when we maximize expected surplus plus O 1 times expected revenue subject to all of the IR and IC constraints. • Since the Myerson-Satterthwaite surplus exceeds the value that is achieved when we maximize expected surplus plus O 1 times expected revenue subject to all of the IR and IC constraints, it must exceed the second-best surplus that is achievable with option price p 0 (otherwise the second-best solution would have at least as large a value of expected surplus plus O 1 times expected revenue as the Myerson-Satterthwaite expected surplus).
